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IN T'HE SUPREivlE COURT
OF T'HE ST.1A_TE OF UTAH
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COl\lP ANY, a corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

No.
10710

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding to review a determination of
the Utah State Tax Commission which held that a
deficiency use tax in the amount of $888.42 was properly assessed against the taxpayer on the use of fuel
oil furnished for commercial consumption within the
llleaning of Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated,
JU,53, as amended.
1

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATJ.
TAX COMMISSION
A formal hearing on this matter was held befo::
all members of the Utah State Tax Commission 1:,
April 27, 1966 and on July 14, 1966 the Commissio:
entered its Decision No. 426, one commissioner disse1
ing, upholding the deficiency assessment.
1.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks to have the majority decisin1
of the Commission reversed and a judgment enterri:
holding that fuel oil used in the propulsion of its foi.1
motives is not used in commercial consumption.

STATEl\'.lENT O:F FACTS
The parties to this action have entered into a Stip:,
lation of Facts (R. 7-23) and these facts are incori
rated in and restated in the decision of the Commissi1
(R. 66-76) and in plaintiff's brief.

1

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
FUEL OIL USED BY THE PLAINT!fl
IN THE PROPULSION OF LOCOMOTffE:
IN THE OPERATION OF ITS RAILROAf
IS FUEL OIL SOLD OR FURNISHED FO~
COMMERCIAL CONSUMPTION AND TH[

2

:~ALE
.1 ~~CT

OR USE OF SUCH FUEL OIL IS SUBTO THE UTAH SALES AND USE TAX.

The applicable statutory provision in this case,
;nce
our sa lcs and use tax are complementary in opera1
tion, Barrett Investment Co. v. State Tax Commission,

Li l'.tah 2d 97, 387 P. 2cl 998 (1964); Geneva Steel
Co. v. Strdc Tu:c Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.
~d 208 (Hl4<9); Union Portland Cement Co. v. State
Tud'ommission, 110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879 (1947),
j, Sel'tion 59-15-J., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

amended, which provides that:
From and after the effective date of this act
there is levied and there shall be collected and
paid:
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible
personal property made within the state of Utah
equivalent to three percent of the purchase price
paid or charged, except that where a person
takes, as a trade-in for part payment of the
merchandise sold, tangible personal property
other than money, the tax shall be computed and
paicl only upon the net difference between the
selling price of the merchandise sold and the
amount of the trade-in allowance. The sale of
l'oal, fuel oil and other fuels shall not be subject
to the tax except as hereinafter provided.
(h) A tax equivalent to three per cent of the
amount paid:

*

*

*

To any person as defined in this act ind11di11g municipal corporations for gas, electril'it)', heat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or
( 2)

3

fi:rnished for domestic ?~ commercial con,i11111 ,.
tzon. None of the prov1s1ons of this suhmh,,
shall apply to electric power plant systems 0111;l
and operated by co-operative or nonprofit to:
porations engaged in rural electrification. (£ 1,
phasis added.)
···

We agree with the plaintiff that it is liable fort!.
tax imposed by the sales and use tax acts only if ti.
fuel oil is used for commercial consumption. The ten~
"commerce" and "commercial" are broad enough:.
include all business activity. 11 Am. Jur., Commercr
sec. 3:
The term "commerce," although employed,
the Constitution, is nowhere defined therein. ],
fact, it has hen said that the term is not suscq
tible of exact and comprehensive definition at!
that no all-embracing definition has ever bee'
formulated. The term is one of extensive impor
and the question as to what constitutes corn
merce should be approached both affirmatirel1
and negatively-that is, from the points of 1'it:
as to what it includes and what it excludes.-~
though the term includes traffic, it is mur
broader. As used in the Constitution, the 11 11r
is equivalent of the phrase "intercourse for tl
purpose of trade" and comprises every spec:t
of commercial intercourse. It includes the P111
chase, sale, and exchange of commodities. ti
transportation of persons and property by b,
and water, and all the instrumentalities by W0
such intercourse is carried on. Stated in anotl:
way, it has been said that the term, as used··
the Constitution, includes the fact of intercmir·
and of traffic and the subject matter of mlr
course and traffic. The fact of intercourse
1
'
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traffic embraces all the means, instruments, and
plat·t·s l1y which intercourse and traffic are earricd on,and comprehends the act of carrying
thew on at these places by and with the;;e means.
The subject matter of intercourse or traffic may
be either things, go(Jds, chattels, merchandise
or persons.
JJ(l\\C\'er, it is uur view that the legislature adopted
tlw term in a narrower sense. The legislal:ure used the
trrn1 "commercial" consumption as opposed to "industrial" cons111nption and intended to exempt from tax;i'iirn1 mil>· items which were truly used in industrial
rnnsumption.
The plaintiff has contended that it need only sho\v
that the foel oil was used for some purpose which is
11ot defined as commercial, whatever that purpose may
be aud which it has not defined. 'Ve contend, however,
that the taxpayer must show not only that its use was
11ot rnmmereial, hut that it must show that the use was
one of industrial consumption.
In tlie Joint Committee Report pertaining to Sec.
of the Federal Revenue Act of 193:2 (an act closely
related to oms), it was stated:

1i](j

The House recedes with an amendment substituting a tax of three per cent of the price paid
for electrical ener.r1,1; and far domestic or commcrt·i11! 11sc (as distinyuislied fro111 industrial
11sc ! to be paid b>' the purchaser and collected
ll\· t lw Yenclor wirli admi11istrati.-c proYisions
a11d au exemption in the case of electrical energy

5

sold to the United States or any state or ten
tory or political subdivision thereof, or the Di:
trict of Columbia. (Emphasis added.)
This statement does not permit an interpretutioJ,
which says that a taxpayer must only show that 11 ,
use was not commercial. It was intended that two broati
categories of use be established within the busine"
community and that a taxpayer must fit within one
of them. A taxpayer's use must be either commerci::
or industrial and if his activity is essentially commerr·;i
he is subject to the tax imposed by the statute.
The plaintiff in its brief has set forth several state
ments made by members of the United States Hou t
of Representatives at the time the statute was bemi
considered. One of the questions asked and the resp0111·
given would seem to indicate that electric railways werr
not to be held subject to the tax imposed by the statult
It is submitted, however, that this exchange betww
members of the House in the course of debate is nn'.
conclusive of the final effect of the bill, particularl1
where it is in conflict with the official documents per·
taining to the consideration of the bill and contrary 1
the statute.
1

1

In St. Louis Refrigeration and Cold Storage ('r
v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 476, (Ct. CL 1942),tk
taxpayer used electrical energy in the operation of'
refrigerated warehouses in the St. Louis area. The t:n
payer there sought to avoid imposition of the tax''
the electrical energy used in the operation of its bni.

6

,s H, too, refered to statements which had been made
dtirnig the course of debate on Sec. 616. The Court
of Claims rejected the taxpayer's contention, stating:
111

The discussions in the Congress covered a wide
range. Many individual statements were made.
These are quoted in extenso by both parties with
conflicting interpretations. However, the Conference Report which \Vas made by the Joint
Conference Committee representing both the
Senate and House, and •which was the last cornmittcc e.1:plmwtio11 before final vote ttas taken,
contained the following explanation of the taxing provision which was made here:
(See .T oint Committee statement quoted above.)

*

*

*

If any ambiguity existed and any explanations were needed a part from the language of
the statute, this final Joint Conference Committee Report makes it clear that it was the intention that the term "commercial" should have
a meaning broader than the restricted sense
plaintiff would have us apply. It explains that
the ta.r applies to commercial as distinguished
from industrial use. It then exempts only electrical energ~' sold to the government, national
or state, or a political subdivision thereof.

The use of the two terms bv wav of contrast
. . . would 5eem to preclude. the· intermediate
classification ,vhich plaintiff attempts to read
into the statute.
It hard]~, seems necessary to go behind the
clear wording of the statute. Certainly it is unllecessar)' to go behind the Joint Conference
Report into the maze of discussion and interpre-
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tation by individual members of the Congre'·
when the statute itself, which is the final pr~dui
of their labors, is couched in simple languag 1 .
clearly expressed.
The court then held that the taxpayer's use i1:
electrical energy constituted commercial consumpliii!
and that it was subject to the tax imposed by the statul•

In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. United Sfa!i,
336 U.S. 176, 69 Sup. Ct. 492, 93 L. Ed. 591 (mg

1

the taxpayer supplied electrical energy to a numoer
of dairy plants and sought to avoid the burden 11
responsibility of collecting the electrical energy tax
the ground that the busines activity of the dairy plant,
was not commercial. There, also, the court refused !1
recognize any twilight zone between industrial and corn
mercial, stating:
111

1111

Although the language of the section does no'
include the word "industrial" it is clear fro[
the legislative history that "commercial" "a'
used in contradistinction to "industrial." Whu1
electricitv sold for commercial consumption ;,
taxed, th.at sold for industrial consumption is no1 •
The court then went on to state:
The legislative history indicates that the tellh
"commercial" was meant to apply to the naturr
of the business in which the energy is consum
and not to the specific purpose to which em
measurable unit of electricity is devoted.
11

This court, too, has considered these classificati(l\
and it has not recognized an area which is neither curE

8

crcial nor industrial. In Uniun Portland Cement Co.
,. Slr1/c 'L'fl,r Commission, llO Utah 135, 170 P. 2d
lilt modified on rehearing llO Utah 152, 176 P. 2d
87Y ( 194<7), the court in considering the use of coal
fiy the taxpayer found that it was called upon to determine whether the use was one of commercial consumption or industrial consumption. These terms, for the
~11rpose of the statute, are used in contra-distinction
:llld there is no in-between area which may or may not
be .,ubjeet to taxation.
111

In Yle\\' of these decisions and the Joint Conference
Committee Report, it is contended that the Utah statute
1houl1l also be interpreted as aJlowing only two classifications - commercial and industrial - and that the
plaintiff must show that its business activity is industrial
in nature in order to be relieved of the sales and use
tax imposed upon the consumption of fuel oil.

There is no simple or general definition of what
business activity is commercial and what is industrial;
and, iu the f'Visconsin Electric Power Co. case, supra,
the Fnited States Supreme Court refused to set forth
Mh a definition, stating:
YV e shall not undertake the difficult and here
needless task of general definition which differentiates for this statutory clause between industrial and commercial in· other lines of business
activity. That is a problem primarily for the
administrators of the section with knowledge of
the specific and varying facts.
~or ha:, this court set forth a general definition of
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industrial consumption as opposed to commercial ,111
sumption.
For the purpose of this case and the statute. ,
would appear that industrial consumption contempbt·
the use of coal, fuel oil or other fuels to process, manu
facture, fabricate or operate on a product whici 1 •
then sold or disposed of.
In the instant case foe fuel oil is not so used. ·n
Laxpaycr is the final consumer and the oil is used:
achieve the taxpayer's primar>T f nnction, propelli1:~
its locomotives over its rail nehvork in the transport
tion of persons and things. The fuel oil, then, was IF
used in nor closely related to the process, rnanufact111
or fabrication of a product which is then sold or dispn1t
of.
This consumption is commercial and there is n.
industrial consumption exempt from the tax as c11
templated by the statute.
11

In Chicago B. & ("'-· R. Co. v. Iowa State Ta,d
rnission, ____ Iowa ____ , 142 N.,V. 2d 407 (1966). ti
taxpayer sought a refund of the use tax imposed up
fuel oil it had purchased outside of the state. 'fl
Iowa statute provided an exemption from the use t
for " . . . fuel ·which is consumed in creating power
heat or steam for processing or for generating e!edr
current." This exemption as so delineated seems clenrl. '
to pertain to industrial consumption such as we hai
discussed above and would provid1~ no exemption f
1
commerical consumption, the term used in our stat 111 '
11

10

The taxpayer in the Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. case
·" 11 giit to come within the exemption by arguing that
tlic f1wl oil was used in generating electricity which
11 a~ then useci to operate its diesel electric engines. The
r·mirt rejected this contention stating:
\Yhat plaintiff does is not generate electric
current, but run locomotives. The fuel oil used
is consumed in operating locomotives. To come
within the definition of property used in processing, in subsection (b), plaintiff is taking an
intermediate step in the use of the fuel to run
the locomotive, not the end result.
inn then at page 411, the court further observed:
Om interpretation is simply, when the statute
is considered as a whole, generating electric current is used in a sense conternplating a complete
action or end result and does not include one who
consumes fuel to run a locomotive, even though
as an intermediate step he generates electric
current. (Emphasis added.)
The court then went on to hold that the taxpayer was
iubject tu the Iowa sales and use tax.

That case is not too unlike the case we have under
consideration here and the difference in the wording
uf the statutes does not compel a different result. The
er Ioll'a statute clearly contemplates an exemption for
r industrial use while contemplating taxation of comr!. iuercial use. even though the statute does not use the
1
1 term ''commercial." Our statute, approaching the questio11 from the other way, declares that all commercial
,:, r·r'ti.\Ulllption is taxable and by implication indicates

11

that industrial consumpL011 ;s Pot taxable, eve11 !]1,11 ,,
the statute does not use the term "industrial.·' s(,
this regard the first L.711iou Portland Cement Co. 1 ,
supra:
It appears, ther•~fore, from all the pnnisi"i
of Sec. 80-15-4 taken together that, first, .1: 1,
of coal, etc., were exempt from the salc.1 ia
except as thereinaher provided. Second, It ;,,
thereinafter pror:idcd <'rwt coal. etc., user/ 1
domestic and corn;nercial ('011sumptio11 were m:iu.
1

subject to the salcfJ i<u, hence this left indusfri,
coals, etc .. not su{;}ecl to the sales ta.r. (Empl1>

sis added).

In both cases the fuel oil is used to provide tlr
energy necessary to propel the companies' locomutir
-the end result or end product ·which the taxpa)·e1
seeking-and this is commercial consumption ratl:1
than industrial consumption.
Finally, some consideration should be giwn tori.
opinion of this court in Or;d1'n Union Raifr.cay 111
Depot Co. v. State Tai' Commission, 16 Utah 2d ~i.·
399 P. 2d 145 ( 1965), (on rehearing). Although ii: 1
court was not there concerned \vi th the use of coal'
fuel oil to propel locomotiYes as in the instant case. I!
court made an observation which we consider tu!
quite pertinent here:
.A. careful c:onsif1era tim~ of the entire snle' t
statute, Section 5~l- ~ 5-4, l__T.C ...A. Hl53, tend»
support the Commi_,s;on's conclnsioti. The s:r
statute which proyides for the tax on coal)''
or furnished for "cmnrnercial" comtllllji'

12

·

( Scetiou 59-15-4 ( b) ( 2) , by its other subdivisoins (b), (d), (e), (f) and (g)) also expressly
taJ'Cs a wide garnut of other seniices such as
t rn 11.1·JHJJ"tation, amusements, hotels, motels, cafes
and laundries, all of which are properly classified as "cornmercial" and includes with them
;,common carrier" operations. (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff is unquestionably a common carrier

is unquestionably engaged in the business of transpurting people and goods. It is the final consumer of
the fiiel oil. As this court observed in the Ogden Unoin
ease just quoted, these are commercial type activities
:mil being commercial the fuel oil used by the plaintiff
i1 subject to the sales and use tax.

<1111!

!\",,

POINT II

. 1:
I

(I'

I
,1,,

PRIOR FAILURE TO TAX FUEL OIL
f'SED IN THE PROPULSION OF LOCOMOTffES, BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE AND INTERPRETATION, IS NO
BAR TO \TALID SUBSEQUENT TAXATION
WHICH IS PROSPECTIVE IN OPERATION .
The plaintiff in its brief has argued that the Commissio11 has never taxed fuel oil used by railroad companies except for one abortive attempt to do so in 1944,
and that it should not be permitted to do so now. 'V"hile
11
:1~iderable weight generally is and should be given
ti. ~111 administrative interpretation, if that interpreta·:,,11 i~ 1vro11g and eontrary to the statute then it should
13

not be allowed to stand. Nor should an administrati'
agency be prohibited from adopting a correct interprt
tation of a statute, prospective in operation, even If
means rejection of a prior interpretation, where 11
experience and the development of the law indiealL
that the prior interpretation was erroneous. As is stattil
in Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, p. 327, an nd
ministrative agency's " ... activities ought not to \1
frozen, but the agency should have freedom to try ti,
achieve general legislative objectives by taking int
account later developments and experience."

:'
1

And, in E. C. Olson Co. v. State Tax Commission.
109 Utah 563, 168 P. 2d 324 (1946), this court he\1!
that the failure of the Tax Commission to collect a ta.1
properly collectible for over 12 years was no bar to j\, ·
present collection of the tax. It was there stated:
I
The facts of this case merely show that for l
over 12 vears the Tax Commission has failed t
discover·that taxes as required by the sales ta .
law were not being paid by plaintiff on the qur'·
tioned sales. The Tax Commission because ui 1
said failure to discover the mistake is now prt·
eluded by statute ... from collecting the defi
ciency except for the past three years, wlncn
collection the Commission is attempting to mah
in this case. It will not be serio11 sly contendfi
that because the Twr Commission has for so mni:
years omitted to assess and collect the t,a,r on 1;
questioned sales it is no•w precludc0 fro~i Pi;
f orming· that dnti;. and from salvagmgt frolll(Ew
past omissions whnt it can for the sta e. ·
phasis added.)
1

11

14

Likewise, the failure of the Commission-because
ill uncertainty and doubt or some other reason-to collect tlte sales and use tax on fuel oil consumed by this
plaintiff aud others similarly situated should not operate
"' a bar to collection now where it has been properly
<lPlrnnined that the fuel oil was furnished for commercial consumption.

nd

ul

IOl1
111\1

1

ta.1

oit,

)

· fori

xl i '

;b

111 f,.
;e u'

The plaintiff devotes a considerable portion of its
brief to the task of taking issue with Attorney Gener:d's Opinion No. 65-038. It is sufficient to state here
that the plaintiff's liability for the Utah sales and use
tax is determined by the statute not the Attorney
General'5 opinion. If the plaintiff is using fuel oil for
commercial consumption, it is subject to the tax.
Further, it should be noted that this case is here on
reYiew not from the determination made in Attorney
General's Opinion No. 65-038 but from a determination
ma1lr by the Utah State Tax Commission in its Decision
Xo. 246 which, in detail, sets forth the basis for that
determination.

This court need only determine whether the Findden ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by the Com,\'hict. nus~ion ,the trier of the facts, are supported by the
rnnl en·dence and whether the Commission correctly inter:11dc:
preted the statute. This court is not called upon to
11W
1111111
determine whether the Attorney General's opinion is
'pt
moneous and should be discarded" since this is not
nni1·
lite matter here on review.
I Ei
prr 1
1
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CONCLUSION
It is contended, then, particularly in view uf ti
case law as it has developed throughout the countr):
discussed above, that the plaintiff's business is cui:.
mercial in nature within the meaning of the Utah sak
and use tax statutes providing for taxation of flit),
sold or furnished for domestic or commercial consum1,
tion. It is urged, then, that the determination of i
Utah State Tax Commission be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

HENRY L. ADAMS

Assistant Attorney Gener::'.
State Capitol Buiiding /

Attorneys for Defendant
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